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Abstract—Internet of things (IoT) produces massive data from
devices embedded with sensors. The IoT data allows creating
profitable services using machine learning. However, previous
research does not address the problem of optimal pricing and
bundling of machine learning-based IoT services. In this paper,
we define the data value and service quality from a machine
learning perspective. We present an IoT market model which
consists of data vendors selling data to service providers, and
service providers offering IoT services to customers. Then,
we introduce optimal pricing schemes for the standalone and
bundled selling of IoT services. In standalone service sales, the
service provider optimizes the size of bought data and service
subscription fee to maximize its profit. For service bundles, the
subscription fee and data sizes of the grouped IoT services are
optimized to maximize the total profit of cooperative service
providers. We show that bundling IoT services maximizes the
profit of service providers compared to the standalone selling.
For profit sharing of bundled services, we apply the concepts
of core and Shapley solutions from cooperative game theory as
efficient and fair allocations of payoffs among the cooperative
service providers in the bundling coalition.
Index Terms—Internet of Things (IoT), IoT pricing, IoT
bundling, machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed significant progress in using
machine learning for solving challenging problems in the
Internet of things (IoT) including data caching [1], [2], activity
recognition [3], [4], channel estimation [5], and security [6],
[7]. Such machine learning-based solutions require massive
datasets for system training. Trading IoT data among firms
allows data vendors to make profit by offering their data
to service providers over the Internet. Service providers use
the bought data in creating and training advanced machine
learning-based IoT services1, e.g., fraud detection, activity
recognition, acoustic modeling, and medical diagnosis. How-
ever, economics of IoT services among service providers,
data vendors, and customers is rarely studied in the literature.
IoT market models and optimal pricing schemes are therefore
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1For the rest of this paper, we use “machine learning-based IoT services”
and “services” interchangeably.
required to ensure maximum profits of firms by achieving op-
timal utilization of the IoT resources and optimal subscription
fees for services.
IoT services can be either sold separately or bundled and
sold as one service package. In particular, multiple service
providers, e.g., fraud detection and recommender systems, can
cooperate to sell a bundled service at a discounted rate while
sharing the resulting profit2. Several major questions related
to this service bundling process arise. Firstly, how is service
quality defined and what are the optimal sizes of data that
should be bought from data vendors? Secondly, should service
providers cooperate to offer a bundled service instead of the
standalone sales of services? Thirdly, once a cooperation
is formed, how do cooperative service providers divide the
resulting profit of a bundled service among themselves?
This paper provides answers for the aforementioned ques-
tions by proposing IoT market models and optimal pricing
schemes of selling machine learning-based IoT services sep-
arately or as bundled packages. The main objective is max-
imizing the profits of IoT service providers while providing
bundled services to customers at discounted price. The key
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• From the service provider’s perspectives, we define the
service quality as a mapping between the bought data
size and the resulting accuracy of machine learning
algorithms.
• We develop an IoT market model for the standalone
selling of services. We then propose a non-linear opti-
mization problem with the objective of maximizing the
profit of service providers. Specifically, a service provider
will make decisions on the optimal data size to buy from
data vendors and the optimal subscription fee that should
be charged to service customers.
• We formulate and solve an IoT service bundling opti-
mization to obtain the optimal bundle subscription fee
and data sizes for each service in the bundle. Here, the
optimization objective is to maximize the total profit of
the cooperative providers inside the bundling coalition.
We show that a bundled service increases the profit of
service providers compared to the standalone sales of
services. Moreover, bundled IoT services are favored
by customers due to their discounted subscription fees
compared to the standalone sales.
2Product bundling is a marketing strategy which is widely used by
economists, e.g., a fast food meal consisting of a sandwich and a soft drink.
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• We present a profit sharing scheme to divide the generated
profit of a bundled IoT service among the cooperative
providers based on their contributions to the bundle profit.
We apply the concepts of core solution and Shapley value
to find the payoff allocations to providers.
Additionally, we provide closed-form solutions for each opti-
mization problem in this paper. Unlike iterative solutions of
nonlinear problems with inequality constraints, e.g., interior
point methods [8], closed-form solutions can be evaluated in
a finite time and are computationally efficient.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work. Section III discusses the IoT market
model and assumptions, and machine learning-based model is
presented as a measure of service qualities. Then, optimization
problems for profit maximizing are derived in Section IV for
the standalone services and in Section V for the bundled IoT
services. Section VI presents a model for payoff allocation
and sharing among service providers in service bundling.
Section VII discusses the experimental evaluation results. The
paper is finally concluded in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A survey of 3, 000 employees from 100 countries reports
that successful firms apply machine learning five times more
than low-performing ones [9]. This clearly shows the impor-
tance of adopting the recent advances in machine learning
for generating revenues and meeting the market demands
on intelligent IoT systems. Moreover, market models and
pricing strategies are integral for maximizing the profit of
selling products and services including wired and wireless
network access [10]–[12], cloud computing [13], and mobile
crowdsensing [14], [15], just to name a few.
A. Economics of Information Goods
Pricing information goods, e.g., software products and
movies, is a well-studied problem in the literature. In [16],
three pricing schemes of information goods were pre-
sented, namely, connection time-based, search-based, and
subscription-based pricing. It has been argued that connection
time-based pricing is less profitable than the other schemes
for highly skilled users. The authors of [17] presented a
nonlinear pricing scheme of information goods based on the
customer usage, i.e., defining a fixed price to each usage level.
In [18], the authors discussed the pay-per-use and unlimited
subscription of information goods. It is shown that a maximum
profit is achieved through competitive pricing. The authors
in [19] discussed the benefits of bundling information goods.
It is shown that an accurate estimation of the user behavior
can be achieved for bundled goods compared to the individual
sales of products.
Pricing and bundling of IoT services is more challenging
than those of classical information goods, as the quality of
information goods can be easily determined, e.g., the quality of
a software is defined based on its supported features, while the
casting and genre of a movie define its price. On the contrary,
the quality of IoT services cannot be directly measured.
B. Economics of Query-based Data Services
Query-based data services extract data from structured
databases and visualize them according to customer requests.
Simple query pricing models can be preferable by buyers, but
applying a complex pricing model increases the revenues of
the content provider [20]. The authors in [21] presented a
query-based pricing scheme of data. The price of a query,
i.e., a question, is defined based on the number of data views
required to provide the answer. In [22], the authors presented
a pricing method in privacy-preserving query systems. This
differential privacy pricing aims at maximizing the accuracy
of queries while maintaining the privacy of the data owners.
The privacy level is defined by the query buyers. The authors
in [23] proposed a query pricing scheme with arbitrage-
prevention. This prevents buyers from combining simple and
cheap queries to achieve the same results of a complex
and expensive query. Such existing query-based schemes are
restricted by design to structured and relational data, and they
do not address unstructured data, e.g., IoT data, which is the
dominant form of data in real-world settings.
C. Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing
Incentive mechanisms are required for maintaining high
user participation and providing fair reward allocation. The
authors in [24] presented a user-centric incentive mechanism
formulated as a reverse auction, and a platform-centric incen-
tive scheme modeled as a Stackelberg game. The user-centric
mechanism enables the participants to compete for a higher
reward. In the platform-centric mechanism, the service acts as
the game leader and announces the reward of completing the
data collection task. The participants are the game followers
and set their sensing time in order to maximize the received re-
ward. Likewise, the authors in [25] modeled the crowdsensing
problem as an online auction, while assuming that the arrival
of participants has a stochastic distribution. In [26], the reward
allocation problem was modeled as an all-pay auction such that
the participant with the highest contribution receives the full
reward.
This paper is fundamentally different from all past works.
First, the problem of defining the quality of service in IoT has
not been previously addressed. Second, existing works have
not considered the data demand and pricing in IoT services
when machine learning is heavily utilized. Third, none of
the existing works has considered the problem of cooperation
among service providers to form a bundled service which is an
effective strategy for profit maximization. This paper addresses
these limitations and presents a market model, bundling strate-
gies, and optimal pricing schemes of IoT services. The novel
data-driven optimizations of this paper allow achieving the
maximum profits from offering IoT services to customers.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first briefly introduce the concept of
machine learning-based IoT services and give real world
examples of IoT services where optimal pricing and bundling
are required. Then, we present a method for defining the value
of data from a machine learning perspective.
Internet
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Fig. 1: System model of machine learning-based IoT services.
A. Machine Learning-Based IoT Services
We consider the IoT service architecture shown in Figure 1.
An IoT service is typically composed of a data vendor, service
provider, and service customers.
• Data vendors: The IoT data is firstly collected, stored and
filtered by a data vendor. The data can be generated by
different devices and technologies, e.g., sensor nodes, IoT
gadgets, and smart phones. In addition to the deployment
cost, the process of data gathering also requires costly
human intervention for data annotation, validation, and
preprocessing, e.g., anomaly detection and missing data
imputation. Accordingly, the data vendor charges data
buyers with a price. The cost of one data unit3 is denoted
by c.
• Service provider: The raw data owned by data vendors
is unprofitable unless suitable analytics tools are applied.
A service provider is a business entity which buys data
from one or more data vendors, uses machine learning
tools, and offers a service to customers willing to pay
a subscription fee. For profit maximization, a rational
service provider decides the data size n (in data units)
to buy from data sources and the subscription fee ps to
charge for his service.
• Service customers: We assume that there are a total of
M customers. Each customer is an independent entity
who decides whether to subscribe to a service provider
based on his willingness-to-pay θ for the service and
the subscription fee ps set by the provider. θ defines the
maximum subscription fee that a customer can pay for a
service based on his evaluation and need for the service.
This IoT market model is useful in many service-oriented
architectures.
• A data marketplace is an online store where entities
can trade data. machine learning, e.g., machine learning
algorithms, can be applied on the data to generate pre-
diction models. Datasets of various types are offered and
exchanged as assets. Examples of data markets include
Azure Marketplace4, Qlik DataMarket5, and Infochimps6.
3We assume that a data unit includes one percent of the full dataset samples.
4https://www.datamarket.azure.com
5https://www.qlik.com
6http://www.infochimps.com
TABLE I: List of frequently used notations and symbols
throughout the paper.
SYMBOL DEFINITION
D Dataset
n Requested data size
c Cost of one data unit
M Number of customers
ps Subscription fee
θ Willingness-to-pay (reservation price) for a
service by customers
F (·) Profit function of a service provider
H Hessian matrix of F (·)
∆i ith-order principal minor of H
L (·) Lagrangian dual problem
λi Lagrangian multiplier
pb Bundle subscription fee
q(·) Service quality function
α Fitting parameters of q(·)
C The core solution set
K Bundling coalition
FK (·) Profit function of a bundling coalition K
HK Hessian matrix of FK (·)
LK (·) Lagrangian dual function of a bundling coali-
tion K
ϕk Payoff allocation for provider k ∈ K in the
core solution
ηk Payoff allocation for provider k ∈ K by the
Shapley solution
• Crowdsourcing services also require optimized market
models for data exchange. Placemeter7, for example, pro-
vides real-time information of pedestrian and vehicular
movement in cities and urban areas. Placemeter allows
users to upload videos of streets and public areas and they
are paid back based on the video quality. Computer vision
algorithms are used by Placemeter to extract information
from real-time data.
• IoT services is a new trend of IoT platforms which are
designated to visualize and trade IoT data. Thingful8 is
an example of these platforms which allows IoT vendors
and owners to visualize geolocations of connected devices
around the world. Likewise, health care systems, such
as PatientsLikeMe9, sell rich medical data which can be
collected with IoT gadgets and other smart technologies.
The list of symbols used in this paper are summarized in
Table I.
B. Machine Learning in IoT
As shown in Figure 2, consider a training data D =
{xi, yi}Bi=1 which includes B tuples of connected feature set
xi ∈ RR and a class label yi ∈ R. yi is only present in su-
pervised learning, e.g., classification and regression problems.
Based on the problem at hand, a feature set xi contains sensing
data of R features such as images in vision problems, audio in
acoustic modeling, text in document classification, and tem-
perature values in weather forecasting. Generally, a machine
learning optimization problem adheres to the following general
formula:
minimize
Ψ
e (D; Ψ) + γg (Ψ) , (1)
7https://www.placemeter.com
8https://www.thingful.net
9https://www.patientslikeme.com
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Fig. 2: Applying machine learning in IoT services.
where e (· ) is a learning objective function designed to fit a
model Ψ to historical data D, g (· ) is a regularization term, γ is
a weighted hyper-parameter. For example, a deep network [27]
has a learning function which is defined as follows:
1
B
B∑
i=1
(
1
2
‖hΨ (xi)− yi‖2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
e(D;Ψ)
+
γ
2
L−1∑
l=1
sl∑
i=1
sl+1∑
j=1
(
Ψ
(l)
ji
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(Ψ)
, (2)
where L is the number of layers in the deep model, sl is the
number of neurons at layer l, hΨ (xi) is the deep model predic-
tion for input xi. The first term is an average sum-of-squared
errors, the second term is a weight decay regularization which
includes the summation modeling parameters. After the model
is trained using the training data, it is tested to define the
accuracy using the unseen testing data.
C. Service Quality
One of the key barriers in the development of data mar-
ketplaces is defining data quality and value to the potential
service providers. In this section, we define the data quality
based on the performance of machine learning models trained
using the data.
Customers do not always subscribe to the cheapest IoT
services. Instead they infer the subscription fee and service
quality. More data is important to increase the accuracy of IoT
services [28], [29]. However, this accuracy gain increases the
cost of bought data. From the service provider’s perspectives,
we define the quality function q(·) of a service as a mapping
between the bought data size to the resulting accuracy of the
machine learning. The quality of the service is equal to the
utility of bought data from the service provider’s perspectives.
For example, machine learning in intrusion detection systems
by energy-constrained sensor networks is aimed for locating
and identifying intruders [30]. The cost of detecting an intruder
is a direct reflection of the value of data.
We introduce the service quality function q(·) to meet the
following empirical assumptions:
• q(·) is an increasing function such that q′(·) > 0.
This assumption is intuitive as more data improves the
accuracy of the analytics and quality of the service.
• q(·) has a decreasing marginal utility such that q′′(·) ≤ 0.
This assumption reflects the empirical accuracy of ma-
chine learning models.
In our data market and pricing framework, q(·) is defined as
follows:
q(n;α) = α1 − α2 exp(−α3n), (3)
where n is the data size and α =
[
α1 α2 α3
]
is a
tuple of three fitting parameters. To find the fitting param-
eters α, we vary the size of raw data D used to fit the
model Ψ. Specifically, a series of O experimentation points(
n(1), ε(1)
)
, . . . ,
(
n(j), ε(j)
)
, . . . ,
(
n(O), ε(O)
)
is performed,
where ε(j) is the service accuracy resulting from a data size
of n(j) with n(j) > n(j+1). q(n;α) is then found by applying
nonlinear least squares for minimizing the sum of squared
errors as follows:
minimize
α
1
O
O∑
j=1
∥∥∥ε(j) − q (n(j);α)∥∥∥2 . (4)
The parameter fitting problem in (4) can be solved iteratively
to find the fitting parameter α [31]. O can be estimated before
transmitting the data from the data vendor to the service
provider through a third party broker which charges a broker
fee. In real-world IoT services, the broker can also manage
the financial transactions, service performance, and service
delivery, e.g., measuring the compliance with the service-level
agreement (SLA).
In Section VII-B, we present extensive experiments that
show the validity of (3) in fitting the real accuracy of machine
learning-based IoT services. For simplified notations, we use
q instead of q(n;α) in the rest of this paper.
IV. IOT MARKET MODEL AND OPTIMAL PRICING OF
STANDALONE SERVICES
In this section, we first develop an IoT market model of sell-
ing standalone IoT services, and we formulate an optimization
problem to maximize the profit of a service provider. Then,
the closed-form solutions for the optimal subscription fee and
requested data size are provided.
We consider the separate sales of a monopolist service
provider providing a service to a set of M potential cus-
tomers as shown in Figure 1. Each customer has a different
willingness-to-pay θ for the data service. If the willingness-
to-pay of a particular customer is higher than or equal to the
subscription fee ps weighted by the service quality q such
that θq > ps, that customer will subscribe to the service.
This indicates that the willingness-to-pay value depends on
the customer evaluation of the service as well as its quality,
i.e., high quality services will attract more customers. Based
on our real-world customer surveys (Figure 6), we show that θ
follows a uniform distribution. Then, the profit of the service
provider is found as follows:
F (ps, n) = MpsP (θq > ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
− nc︸︷︷︸
data cost
(5)
= Mps
(
1− ps
q
)
− nc (6)
where q = α1−α2 exp (−α3n) is the service quality function.
The first term of (5) is the revenue of offering the service to
the customers with the subscription fee ps. As θ is assumed
to follow a uniform distribution, the expression P (θq > ps) =
1− psq defines the probability of subscribing to the service by
the customers. The second term of (5) is the total data price
paid to the data vendor which is equal to the requested data
size multiplied by the data unit cost. The marginal cost of
running the service is negligible.
We next formulate a profit maximization optimization based
on the profit function in (5) for the service provider to decide
their optimal requested data size and subscription fee.
A. Profit Maximization of Service Providers
The service provider is assumed to be rational and is
interested in maximizing his individual profit. A non-linear
optimization problem can be formulated to choose the optimal
data size n∗ that should be bought from the data vendor and
optimal subscription fee p∗s to be charged to the customers as
follows:
maximize
n,ps
F (ps, n) = Mps
(
1− ps
q
)
− nc
subject to C1 : ps ≥ 0,
C2 : n ≥ 0.
(7)
The objective function of (7) maximizes the profit of the
service provider. The two constraints C1 and C2 are required
to ensure non-negative solutions for the subscription fee and
requested data size.
Proposition 1. F (ps, n) is concave, and hence the closed-
form solution of the optimization problem maximize
ps,n
F (ps, n)
is globally optimal.
Proof: We use Sylvester’s criterion of twice differen-
tiable functions to prove that the Hessian matrix H of
F (ps, n) is negative semidefinite, and hence the concavity of
F (ps, n) [32]. Suppose that the principal minors of H are
denoted as {∆i}i=1,2, where i is the order of the principal
minors. Based on Sylvesters criterion, H is negative semidef-
inite if and only if the condition (−1)i ∆i ≥ 0 holds, i.e., every
odd-order principal minor is non-positive and every even-order
principal minor is non-negative. The Hessian matrix H of
F (ps, n) is obtained as shown in (11) at the top of the next
page. The first-order principal minors of H are derived as
follows:
∆1,1 =
−2M
q
≤ 0, (8)
∆1,2 =
−2Mα22α23p2s exp (−2α3n)
q3
− Mα2α
2
3p
2
s exp (−α3n)
q2
≤ 0. (9)
The principal minor of order two is derived as follows:
∆2,1 =
2α2 (Mα3ps)
2
q3
≥ 0. (10)
Accordingly, Sylvester’s criterion is satisfied. H is negative
semidefinite and F (ps, n) is concave.
We next apply the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions
to find the optimal solutions of (7). The KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality when applied
to concave functions [8].
B. Optimal Subscription Fee and Requested Data Size
Converting the constrained profit maximization problem (7)
into a minimization problem and formulating the Lagrangian
dual problem results in the following unconstrained Lagrange
dual function:
L ({ps, n} , λ1, λ2) = −Mps
(
1− ps
q
)
+ nc− λ1ps − λ2n,
(12)
where λ1 and λ2 are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints
C1 and C2, respectively. The first derivatives of (12) with
respect to ps and n are as follows:
∂L (·)
∂ps
= M
(
ps
q
− 1
)
+
Mps
q
− λ1, (13)
∂L (·)
∂n
= c− λ2 − Mα2α3p
2
s exp (−α3n)
q2
, (14)
where λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0 (no active constraints). Setting
both derivatives to zero, the optimal closed-form solutions are
found as follows:
p∗s =
Mα1α3 − 4c
2Mα3
, (15)
n∗ =
1
α3
log
(
Mα2α3
4c
)
, (16)
where the condition Mα1α3 ≥ 4c must hold to ensure
positive values of n∗ and p∗s . Accordingly, the maximum profit
F (p∗s, n
∗) of the provider is found by substituting the optimal
values of n∗ and p∗s in (5).
V. IOT MARKET MODEL AND OPTIMAL PRICING OF
BUNDLED SERVICES
In this section, we first present a market model where
bundling is used by two cooperative service providers (denoted
as Service 1 and Service 2). We denote the bundling coalition
as K. The two services are grouped together in one package
and sold at a discounted subscription fee, i.e., subscribing to
the two services separately costs more than the bundled ser-
vice. It is important to note that customers can still subscribe to
services separately. Then, we develop an optimization problem
to select the optimal bundle subscription fee and requested data
sizes by both providers.
A. Profit Maximization of Bundled Services
Consider two service providers that form a coalition K to
provide a bundled service to a base of M customers as shown
in Figure 3. The subscription fee of the bundle is denoted as
pb. The qualities of Services 1 and 2 are denoted as q1 and q2,
respectively. The data unit costs paid by Services 1 and 2 are
c1 and c2, respectively. We define the reservation prices θ1 and
θ2 as the willingness of the customers to pay for Services 1
H =

−2M
q
2Mα2α3ps exp (−α3n)
q2
2Mα2α3ps exp (−α3n)
q2
−2Mα22α23p2s exp (−2α3n)
q3
− Mα2α
2
3p
2
s exp (−α3n)
q2
 . (11)
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Fig. 3: System model of offering IoT services as one bundle.
and 2 in the bundle. Specifically, a customer will decide to
subscribe to a bundled service if the following relation hold
θ1q1 + θ2q2 ≥ pb (17)
which indicates that the customer evaluation of the bundled
service is higher than its subscription fee. The profit optimiza-
tion problem of a bundled service is then defined as follows:
maximize
pb,n1,n2
FK (pb, n1, n2) =
MpbP (θ1q1 + θ2q2 ≥ pb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
−n1c1 − n2c2︸ ︷︷ ︸
data cost
subject to C1, C2,
C3 : pb ≥ 0,
C4 : n1 ≥ 0,
C5 : n2 ≥ 0,
(18)
where P (θ1q1 + θ2q2 ≥ pb) is the demand on the bundle
service by customers, i.e., the probability that a customer
will decide to subscribe to a bundled service. The objective
function of (18) maximizes the total bundling profit of coop-
erative service providers which is equal to the sale revenue
minus the paid data cost. C3, C4, and C5 are required to
ensure positive solution values for pb, n1, and n2, respectively.
The constraints C1 and C2 are the optimization constraints
which depend on the bundle price and service quality. In
particular, there are 4 possible demand patterns (defining the
optimization constraints C1 and C2) where (17) holds as
demonstrated by the shaded areas in Figure 4. Specifically,
P (θ1q1 + θ2q2 ≥ pb) can be found for each case as follows:
Case 1: 1− 0.5pb
q1
pb
q2
, (19)
Case 2: 0.5Mpb
(
1− pb
q1
+ 1− (pb − q2)
q1
)
, (20)
Case 3: 0.5Mpb
(
1− pb
q2
+ 1− (pb − q1)
q2
)
, (21)
Case 4: 0.5Mpb
(
1− (pb − q1)
q2
)(
1− (pb − q2)
q1
)
. (22)
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Fig. 4: The four demand cases on a bundled IoT service.
(19)-(22) correspond to Case 1 through Case 4 of Figure 4,
respectively. q1 = α11 − α21 exp (−α31n1) and q2 = α12 −
α22 exp (−α32n2) are the quality of IoT services 1 and 2,
respectively.
Proposition 2. FK (pb, n1, n2) is concave, and hence
the closed-form solution of the optimization problem
maximize
pb,n1,n2
FK (pb, n1, n2) is globally optimal.
Proof: We will next prove the concavity of the profit
function for Case 1 (C1 : pb ≤ q1 and C2 : pb ≤ q2) using
Sylvester’s criterion which provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for the concavity of FK (·) [32]. The other demand
cases (Cases 2-4) can be analyzed similarly and are omitted
due to the space limit. The Hessian matrix HK of FK (·) for
Case 1 is defined as in (23) shown at the top of the next page.
∆1,1 ∆1,2, and ∆1,3 are the three first-order principal minors
of HK which can be derived as follows:
∆1,1 = −3Mpb
q1q2
≤ 0, (24)
∆1,2 = −Mα
2
21α
2
31p
3
b exp (−2α31n1)
q31q2
− 0.5Mα21α
2
31p
3
b exp (−α31n1)
q21q2
≤ 0, (25)
∆1,3 = −Mα
2
22α
2
32p
3
b exp (−2α32n2)
q1q32
− 0.5Mα22α
2
32p
3
b exp (−α32n2)
q1q22
≤ 0. (26)
HK =

∆1,1
1.5Mα21α31p
2
b exp (−α31n1)
q12q2
1.5Mα22α32p
2
b exp (−α32n2)
q1q22
1.5Mα21α31p
2
b exp (−α31n1)
q12q2
∆1,2
−0.5Mα21α22α31α32p3b
q12q22 exp (α31n1) exp (α32n2)
1.5Mα22α32p
2
b exp (−α32n2)
q1q22
−0.5Mα21α22α31α32p3b
q12q22 exp (α31n1) exp (α32n2)
∆1,3
 . (23)
There are also three second-order principal minors for HK
which are obtained as follows:
∆2,1 =
0.75M2α21α
2
31p
4
b exp (−α31n1) (α11 + q1)
q41q
2
2
≥ 0,(27)
∆2,2 =
0.75M2α22α
2
32p
4
b exp (−α32n2) (α12 + q2)
q21q
4
2
≥ 0,(28)
∆2,3 =
0.25M2α21α22α
2
31α
2
32p
6
bA1
q41q
4
2
≥ 0, (29)
where
A1 = exp (α31n1 + α32n2)
(
α11α12+
α11α22 exp (−α32n2) + α12α21 exp (−α31n1)
)
. (30)
Finally, HK has one third-order principle minor defined as
follows:
∆3,1 =
−0.375M3α21α22α231α232p7bA2
q51q
5
2
≤ 0, (31)
where
A2 = exp (−α31n1 − α32n2) (α11q2 + α12q1) . (32)
Accordingly, Sylvester’s criterion is satisfied. This proves
that HK is negative semidefinite and FK (·) is concave. Then,
the solution of the optimization problem maximize
pb,n1,n2
FK (·) is
globally optimal.
We next provide the closed-form solutions for the profit
maximization problem of bundled services by applying the
KKT conditions.
B. Optimal Subscription Fee and Requested Data Sizes
1) Case 1
(
C1 : pb ≤ q1 and C2 : pb ≤ q2
)
: Substituting
the customer demand of (19) in (18), the Lagrangian dual
function is defined as follows:
LK ({pb, n1, n2} , λ1, . . . , λ5) = −Mpb
(
1− 0.5p
2
b
q1q2
)
+
n1c1+n2c2+λ1 (pb − q1)+λ2 (pb − q2)−λ3pb−λ4n1−λ5n2,
(33)
where λ1, . . . , λ5 are the Lagrange multipliers of the con-
straints C1, . . . , C5 in (18). The first derivatives of (33) with
respect to pb, n1, and n2 are found as follows:
∂LK (·)
∂pb
=
Mpb
q1q2
− λ2 − λ3 − λ1
− Mq2 (−0.5pb + (α11 − α21 exp (−α31n1)))
q1q2
, (34)
∂LK (·)
∂n1
= c1 − λ4 + α21α31λ1 exp (−α31n1)
− Mα21α31pb exp (−α31n1)
q1
+
Mα21α31pb exp (−α31n1) (−0.5pb + q2q1)
q1q2
, (35)
∂LK (·)
∂n2
= c2 − λ5 + α22α32λ2 exp (−α32n2)
− Mα22α32pb exp (−α32n2)
q2
+
Mα22α32pb exp (−α32n2) (−0.5pb + q1q2)
q1 (q2)
2 . (36)
Applying the KKT necessary and sufficient conditions with no
active constraints (λ1, . . . , λ5 = 0) by setting the derivatives
in (34)-(36) to zero, the closed-form solution can be deduced
as follows:
n∗1 =
1
α31
log
(
α21
α11
−
1
6α21A3
α11α32c1
)
, (37)
n∗2 =
1
α32
log
(
α22
α12
−
1
6α22A3
α12α31c2
)
, (38)
p∗b = −
0.5A3
mα31α32
, (39)
λ1, . . . , λ5 = 0, (40)
where
A3 = 3α31c2 + 3α32c1 −
(
8
2
α11α12M
2α231α
2
32
+ 9α231c
2
2 − 18α31α32c1c2 + 9α232c21
)0.5
. (41)
The global solution is achieved (Proposition 2), and these
closed-form expressions satisfy all constraints C1, . . . , C5 of
the optimization problem in (18).
2) Case 2
(
C1 : pb ≤ q1 and C2 : pb ≥ q2
)
: When the
customer demand is defined as in (20) and the optimization
constraints are C1 : pb ≤ q1 and C2 : pb ≥ q2, the Lagrangian
dual problem of (18) is defined as follows:
LK ({pb, n1, n2} , λ1, . . . , λ5) =
− 0.5Mpb
(
1− pb
q1
+ 1− (pb − q2)
q1
)
+ n1c1 + n2c2
+ λ1 (pb − q1)− λ2 (pb − q2)− λ3pb − λ4n− λ5n2, (42)
where λ1, . . . , λ5 are the Lagrange multipliers. Taking the
derivatives of (42) with respect to pb, n1, and n2, the closed-
form solution can be found by solving the resulting derivatives
as follows:
n∗1 =
1
α31
log
(
0.25α21A4
α32c1 (α11 − α12)
)
, (43)
n∗2 =
1
α32
log
(
0.5
c2
(
Mα22α32 − 0.5α22A4
α31 (α11 − α12)
))
,
(44)
p∗b =
0.5A4
Mα31α32
− 2α31c2 + 2α32c1 −Mα12α31α32
Mα31α32
, (45)
λ∗1 =
0.25A4
α31α32 (α11 − α12) − 0.5M, (46)
λ∗2 =
0.25A4
α31α32 (α11 − α12) , (47)
λ∗3 = λ
∗
4 = λ
∗
5 = 0, (48)
where
A4 = 2α31c2 + 2α32c1 +Mα11α31α32 −Mα12α31α32
− 2
(
0.25M2α211α
2
31α
2
32 − 0.5M2α11α12α231α232
+ 0.25M2α212α
2
31α
2
32 +Mα11α
2
31α32c2 −Mα11α31α232c1
−Mα12α231α32c2 +Mα12α31α232c1 + α231c22
+ 2α31α32c1c2 + α
2
32c
2
1
)0.5
. (49)
3) Case 3
(
pb ≥ q1 and pb ≤ q2
)
: In this case, the
Lagrangian dual function of (18) and (21) can be written as:
LK ({pb, n1, n2} , λ1, . . . , λ5) =
− 0.5Mpb
(
1− pb − q1
q2
+ 1− pb
q2
)
+ n1c1 + n2c2
− λ1 (pb − q1) + λ2 (pb − q2)− λ3pb − λ4n− λ5n2. (50)
Taking the derivatives of (50) with respect to pb, n1, and n2,
the closed-form solution can be expressed as follows:
n∗1 =
1
α31
log
(
0.25α21A5
α32c1 (α11 − α12)
)
, (51)
n∗2 =
1
α32
log
(
0.5
c2
(
Mα22α32 − 0.5α22A5
(α31 (α11 − α12))
))
,
(52)
p∗b =
0.5A5
Mα31α32
− 2α31c2 + 2α32c1 −Mα12α31α32
Mα31α32
, (53)
λ∗1 = 0.5M −
0.25A5
α31α32 (α11 − α12) , (54)
λ∗2 = −
0.25A5
α31α32 (α11 − α12) , (55)
λ∗3 = λ
∗
4 = λ
∗
5 = 0, (56)
where
A5 = 2α31c2 + 2α32c1 +Mα11α31α32 −Mα12α31α32
− 2
(
0.25M2α211α
2
31α
2
32 − 0.5M2α11α12α231α232
+ 0.25M2α212α
2
31α
2
32 +Mα11α
2
31α32c2 −Mα11α31α232c1
−Mα12α231α32c2 +Mα12α31α232c1 + α231c22
+ 2α31α32c1c2 + α
2
32c
2
1
)0.5
. (57)
4) Case 4
(
pb ≥ q1 and pb ≥ q2
)
: With (18) and (22),
the Lagrangian dual function can be formulated as follows:
LK ({pb, n1, n2} , λ1, . . . , λ5) =
− 0.5Mpb
(
1− (pb − q1)
q2
)(
1− (pb − q2)
q1
)
+n1c1 +n2c2
− λ1 (pb − q1)− λ2 (pb − q2)− λ3pb − λ4n− λ5n2. (58)
Taking the derivatives of (58) with respect to pb, n1, and n2,
the closed-form solution can be deduced as follows:
n∗1 =
1
α31
log
(
0.25α21α31A6
c1 (α11α31α32 − α12α31α32)
)
, (59)
n∗2 =
1
α32
log
(
0.5
c2
(
mα22α32 − 0.5α22α32A6
α11α31α32 − α12α31α32
))
,
(60)
p∗b = α11 −
α21c1 (α11α31α32 − 1.0α12α31α32)
0.25α21α31A6
, (61)
λ∗1 =
0.25A6
α11α31α32 − α12α31α32 − 0.5m, (62)
λ∗2 = −
0.25A6
α11α31α32 − α12α31α32 , (63)
λ∗3 = λ
∗
4 = λ
∗
5 = 0, (64)
where
A6 = 2α31c2 + 2α32c1 +Mα11α31α32 −Mα12α31α32
−
(
M2α211α
2
31α
2
32 − 2M2α11α12α231α232 +M2α212α231α232
+ 4Mα11α
2
31α32c2 − 4Mα11α31α232c1 − 4Mα12α231α32c2
+4Mα12α31α
2
32c1 +4α
2
31c
2
2 +8α31α32c1c2 +4α
2
32c
2
1
)0.5
.
(65)
The cooperative providers should run the optimization of the
four cases derived in this section. The case with the maximum
resulting profit should be used in the bundled service.
VI. PROFIT SHARING AMONG IOT PROVIDERS
After forming a coalition K to sell IoT services as a
bundle, the cooperative providers share the resulting profit.
This section presents a profit sharing model using the core
solution and Shapley value from cooperative game theory [33]
to define the payoff allocations for the cooperative providers
in K.
A. The Core Solution
Let ϕk indicate the profit share of service provider k ∈ K.
The core solution set is calculated as follows [33]:
C =
{
ϕ |
∑
k∈K
ϕk = F
∗
K︸ ︷︷ ︸
group rationality
∧
∑
k∈S
ϕk ≥ F ∗S ,S ⊆ K︸ ︷︷ ︸
individual rationality
}
(66)
where ϕ ∈ R2 is a vector of profit allocations ϕk, F ∗K is the
profit of bundling, and F ∗S is the profit of separate selling when
|S| = 1. C includes a set of profit allocations which guarantee
no service provider will reject the payoff allocation, i.e., no
incentive of leaving the coalition to sell services separately.
The core solution can be empty, containing a large number
of possible solutions, or unfair to a service provider based on
the individual contributions to the bundle formulation. There-
fore, we next present the Shapley solution which provides a
single and fair solution of the profit sharing problem.
B. The Shapley Solution
The Shapley solution provides a fair allocation of the
bundling profit among the service providers forming a
bundling coalition K. For each cooperative provider k ∈ K,
the Shapley value η assigns a payoff ηk found as [33]:
ηk =
∑
S⊆K\{k}
|S|! (|K| − |S| − 1)!
|K|!︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of ordering
(
F ∗S∪{k} − F ∗S
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution
. (67)
The first term defines the probability of ordering providers
to form the bundle coalition. The second term defines the
marginal contribution of each provider k ∈ K to the bundle.
The Shapley solution is efficient such that
∑
k∈K ηk = F
∗
K.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents extensive numerical experiments to
evaluate the performance of the proposed market model and
pricing schemes for selling IoT services separately and as a
bundle.
A. Datasets, machine learning, and Market Setup
We run experiments on three IoT services trained on real-
world datasets. Today there are a few standard machine
learning models that are widely used across tasks in IoT.
To build the IoT service, we use three popular machine
learning algorithms, namely, deep learning [27], support vector
machines [34], and multinomial naive Bayes [35].
• Service 1 (text categorization): IoT requires context
awareness and consistent understanding of the user
data [36]. We build Service 1 that predicts the user
context from text data. Service 1 is trained on the
20 newsgroups dataset [37]. The dataset includes 18, 828
data samples classified into 20 topics, e.g., sports, com-
puter hardware, politics, etc. We use 13, 180 samples for
training the machine learning models and 5, 648 samples
for testing and accuracy prediction. A data unit contains
188 samples, i.e., one percent of the full dataset samples.
We assume that the data vendor offers this dataset with
a data unit cost of c1 = 0.110.
• Service 2 (sentiment analysis): IoT wearables provide
a robust tool for determining the sentiment aspects,
e.g., opinion, feedback, and emotion, of users [38]. Sen-
timent predicting IoT has many applications in smart
homes, recommender systems, and content-based filter-
ing. We build a data service to predict the sentiment
(either positive or negative polarities) by training the ma-
chine learning models on the Sentiment140 dataset [39].
The dataset contains 629, 146 tweet samples for model
training and 419, 431 samples for testing. Each data unit
includes 10, 482 samples. We assume that a data unit has
a cost value of c2 = 0.05.
• Service 3 (Optical character recognition): IoT devices
generally contain high-resolution cameras for capturing
image and video data. The recent advances in machine
learning enable extracting useful information from visual
data. Service 3 is an IoT service that extracts text from
handwritten images, e.g., this is needed for monitoring the
expiration date of food in a smart fridge [40]. We train the
machine learning models using the MNIST dataset [41].
The dataset contains 50, 000 training image samples and
10, 000 testing images. A data unit includes 600 samples.
Text classification (Services 1 and 2) typically requires trans-
forming the text into numerical features suitable for different
classifiers. In our experiments, we use a popular feature set
known as term frequency–inverse document frequency (TF-
IDF) [42] which counts the number of times that a word
appears in a text. Unless otherwise stated, we assume a base
of M = 50 customers.
10It is in monetary unit which is currency independent.
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Fig. 5: Estimating the utility of data q(n;α) of three popular classifiers. The first row is for Service 1, the second row is for
Service 2, and the third row is for Service 3, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the willingness-to-pay responses to our real-
world customer surveys conducted using Google Surveys11
for estimating the willingness-to-pay θ distribution in IoT. In
each survey, we asked 100 users open-ended questions that
elicit a direct expression of value. For example, to find θ of
Service 2, we used the question of “how much would you
be willing to pay for a wearable device that plays music
and suggests activities (e.g., sports and readings) based on
your sentiment and mood?”. Figure 6 shows that θ follows a
uniform distribution. For model selection, we use the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) [43]. We tested many relevant
data distributions including the negative binomial, poisson,
and geometric distributions. The uniform distribution has the
minimum AIC values of 397.5 and 274.5 for Services 1 and
2, respectively.
B. Service Quality
Figure 5 shows our extensive experiments on finding the
quality of Services 1-3. The recognition accuracy increases as
the requested data size increases and vice versa. When the
requested data size is increased, the increase in the accuracy
diminishes. Besides, we note that the utility function defined
in (3) fits the series of real data points well. We also observe
11https://surveys.google.com
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Fig. 6: Modeling the willingness-to-pay distribution based on
real-world (empirical) customer surveys. θ of Services 1 and
2 follows a uniform distribution.
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Fig. 7: Profit F (ps, n) of a monopolist service provider under
varied data sizes and subscription fees.
a similar diminishing increase of accuracy for other machine
learning algorithms such as k-nearest neighbors, logistic re-
gression, random forests, and passive aggressive classifiers.
However, due to the space limit, we omit them from this paper.
Based on these results, for the rest of our experiments we
use q1 = 0.884 − 0.59 exp (−0.114n1) and q2 = 0.82 −
0.069 exp (−0.142n2) for service qualities which correspond
to using deep learning on the 20 newsgroups (Service 1) and
Sentiment140 (Service 2) datasets.
C. Separate Selling of Services
In this section, we study the separate sales of Service 1 un-
der the model and pricing schemes of Section IV. Assuming a
deep learning implementation of Service 1, the service quality
parameters are α1 = 0.884, α2 = 0.59 , and α3 = 0.114 as
specified in Figure 5.
1) Profit Maximization: In Figure 7, we analyze the profit
F (ps, n) of Service 1 under varied requested data sizes n and
subscription fees ps. When the subscription fee is high, fewer
customers will be interested in buying the service which will
accordingly decrease the resulting profit. A low subscription
fee has a similar negative effect on the profit even though more
customers will decide to buy the service. Likewise, a poor
spending on buying data from the vendor results in poor profit
for the provider as fewer customers will buy the service due
to its low accuracy. When the requested data size is high, the
service accuracy will increase, but the profit will be negatively
affected due to the high data cost. Recall that the profit is the
revenue value that remains after accounting for the data cost
as in (5).
Using (16) and (15) to determine the optimal service setting,
we find that the optimal data size n∗ = 18.68 and subscription
fee p∗s = 0.41 resulting in an optimal profit of F (n
∗, p∗s) =
8.31.
As data is the main commodity in IoT services, we next
study the impact of data price (Section VII-C2) and data
quality (Section VII-C3) in the economics of a monopolist
service provider.
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2) The Impact of Data Cost: Figure 8 shows the impact of
the data cost c on the optimal solutions, i.e., optimal requested
data size n∗ and subscription fee p∗s , and the resulting profit
F (n∗, p∗s) from the separate sales of Service 1. Firstly, we
observe that the service provider will make a lower profit out
of the service if the data price is increased. Secondly, when
the data price is high, the service provider will try to decrease
the cost by requesting less data from the data vendor. Then,
as requesting less data decreases the service quality q, the
service provider should also decrease the subscription fee in
order to attract more customer subscriptions. This is intuitive
as the customers infer both the subscription fee and the service
quality when making their subscription decision as defined
in (5). Increasing the data price beyond c = 0.84 produces
infeasible solutions, i.e., negative profit, as the constraint
Mα2α3 ≥ 4c will not be satisfied.
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Fig. 10: Optimal profit F (p∗s, n
∗) of the service provider,
subscription fee p∗s , and requested data size n
∗ under varied
customer bases M .
3) The Impact of Data Quality: We consider the impact of
buying data of different qualities q by changing the data quality
parameter α3. Specifically, higher values of α3 result in higher
data qualities q as specified in (3). We observe two important
results from Figure 9. Firstly, the service provider should
always look for high quality data as it helps them to maximize
their profit as less data is required for service fitting. If the
provider buys more quality data up to a level (n∗ = 27.13 at
α3 = 0.037), then less data will be requested as enhancing the
service quality beyond this level will not be essential for most
customers. This is because the customers infer both the service
quality and the subscription fee. Secondly, when the data
quality is high, less data is required to achieve a satisfactory
quality. The low spending in buying data maximizes the
provider’s profit.
4) The Impact of Customer Base Size: Figure 10 shows
the optimal solutions, i.e., optimal requested data size n∗
and subscription fee p∗s , and the generated profit F (n
∗, p∗s)
under varied sizes of the customer base M . We observe that
the service provider will increase his investment in buying
more data as the customer size increases (more customer
demand). Likewise, the subscription fee p∗s of the service will
be increased as a result of the increased demand. This increase
in demand positively impacts the resulting profit of the service
provider.
D. Service Bundling
In the following, we consider the marketing strategy of
grouping Services 1 and 2 into one bundled service forming a
coalition K. Deep learning is used for machine learning in both
services resulting in quality functions as shown in Figure 5.
Specifically, the service quality parameters are α11 = 0.884,
α21 = 0.59 , and α31 = 0.114 for Services 1, while the quality
parameters are α12 = 0.82, α22 = 0.069 , and α32 = 0.142
for Service 2. We use the analysis of Section V for service
bundling and pricing.
1) Profit Maximization: The profits FK (pb, n1, n2) of the
bundled service is plotted in Figure 11 which correspond to
the four demand cases of (19)-(22). The maximum profit is
achieved by using Case 1 (C1 : pb ≤ q1 and C2 : pb ≤
q2) with the closed-form solutions defined in (37)-(40). The
optimal solutions are n∗1 = 19.29, n
∗
2 = 7.01, p
∗
b = 0.658
which generate an optimal profit of FK (p∗b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2) = 19.67.
Figure 12 illustrates the market equilibrium of selling Ser-
vices 1 and 2 separately or as one bundle under coalition K.
Using (16), (15), and (5) to analyze the separate sales, we find
that the optimal subscription fee and profit values of Services 1
and 2 are p∗s1 = 0.41, F1 (n
∗
1, p
∗
s1) = 8.31, p
∗
s2 = 0.39, and
F2 (n
∗
2, p
∗
s2) = 9.58, respectively.
• For separate sales (Figure 12a), the optimal market equi-
librium is shown as the vertical θ1q1 = p∗s1 = 0.41 and
horizontal θ2q2 = p∗s2 = 0.39 lines for Services 1 and
2, respectively. There are four decision areas centered
by the point H ≡
(
p∗s1
q1
,
p∗s2
q2
)
. Firstly, the customers
with reservation prices that lie to the northeast of H
will subscribe to both services. Secondly, the customers
with reservation prices that lie to the southeast of H
will subscribe to Service 1 only, Thirdly, the customers
with reservation prices that lie to the northwest of H
will subscribe to Service 2 only, Finally, the customers
with reservation prices that lie to the southwest of H will
not subscribe to any service as their evaluations of both
service are below the market equilibrium values.
• Figure 12b shows that customers with reservation prices
that lie above the line θ1q1 + θ2q2 = p∗b will decide to
subscribe to the bundled service. On the other hand, the
customers with reservation prices that lie below the line
θ1q1 + θ2q2 = p
∗
b will not subscribe to the bundle.
We can also observe that the customers will be interested in
buying the two services as one bundled service at the dis-
counted subscription price p∗b < p
∗
s1+p
∗
s2. From the provider’s
perspectives, the bundled service helps in maximizing their
profits FK (p∗b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2) > F1 (n
∗
1, p
∗
s1) + F2 (n
∗
2, p
∗
s2). This
profit is shared among the two service providers as will be
discussed later in Section VII-E.
2) The Impact of Data Cost: While fixing the data price
of Service 2 (c2 = 0.05), we have varied the data price
of Service 1 and observed the market parameters of the
bundled service as in Figure 13. There are several important
observations that can be highlighted. The optimal requested
data sizes n∗1 and n
∗
2, bundle subscription fee p
∗
b , and bundling
profit FK (p∗b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2) decrease as the data price c1 increases.
Specifically, when the data price c1 is high, the cooperative
providers will try to minimize the total cost by buying less data
for Service 1 n∗1. Likewise, this will decrease the ability of
buying data for Service 2 n∗2 which will be slightly decreased.
Finally, to maintain the market equilibrium, the subscription
fee p∗b of the service bundle should be also decreased for
high values of data price c1. This inverse correlation can be
deduced from (17) where the customers consider the qualities
of Services 1 and 2 as well as the bundle subscription fee
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Fig. 11: Profit from the bundled service under varied data sizes (n1 and n2). (a)-(d) are for Cases 1-4, respectively.
when making their subscription decisions.
3) The Impact of Customer Base Size: Figure 14 shows
that the optimal requested data sizes n∗1 and n
∗
2, subscription
fee p∗b , and bundling profit FK (p
∗
b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2) are proportional
to the number of customers M . In particular, an increased
number of customers M results in higher values of n∗1, n
∗
2,
p∗b , and FK (p
∗
b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2). As any other demand relationship in
economics, the subscription fee and profit increase for high
demands by customers. Similarly, the service providers will
buy more data to provide better quality services as more
customers would be interested in buying the service.
E. Profit Sharing of the Service Bundle
We next analyze the profit sharing among the two service
providers forming the bundled service.
1) Payoff Allocation: Recall from Section VII-D1 that the
bundling profit is FK (p∗b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2) = 19.67, while the profits
of separate selling are F1 (n∗1, p
∗
s1) = 8.31 and F2 (n
∗
2, p
∗
s2) =
9.58 of Services 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 15 shows four
important solution concepts. The first solution (gray shaded
area) gives the feasible payoffs. The second solution gives
“efficient payoffs” which satisfy the constraint ϕ1 + ϕ2 =
FK (p∗b , n
∗
1, n
∗
2). However, this solution does not guarantee
that the individual payoff of each provider resulting from the
bundling strategy is higher than that of the separate service
selling. Therefore, a provider may reject his payoff and decide
to sell his service separately. The third solution is the core
which is found as in (66). This solution guarantees that
the individual payoffs of providers are higher with bundling
compared to the separate selling of services. The final solution
is the Shapley value as in (67) which gives fair payoffs
for the cooperative providers in K based on their individual
contribution to the service bundle.
2) The Impact of Individual Contributions on Payoffs: In
Figure 16, we further analyze the fair allocation of payoffs
with the Shapley concept. In particular, we consider the case
when the data price of Service 1 is varied while fixing the
data price of Service 2 (c2 = 0.05). The payoff allocations
by the Shapley value are always inside the core solution area
(the gray shaded area). Firstly, we compare the profit of selling
Service 1 and 2 separately or as a bundled service. The payoff
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Fig. 12: Market equilibrium under different customer reserva-
tions. (a) Separate selling of the two services with subscription
fees of p∗s1 = 0.41 and p
∗
s2 = 0.39. (b) Selling the two services
as a bundle with bundle subscription fee of pb = 0.659.
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Fig. 15: Profit sharing of the bundled service.
allocations to each service by the Shapley value are higher than
those of the separate sales. In the separate selling, changing
the price of one service does not change the profit of the other
service. Secondly, the payoff allocations in the bundled service
reflect the contributions of an individual service to the profit of
the bundled service. When the data price of a service is high,
the payoff of that particular service will be fairly decreased
due to the high cost introduced in building the bundle. This
fair allocation of payoff in the Shapley concept provides an
incentive for cooperative service providers to search for the
best deals and vendors of data. Thirdly, it can be noted that the
high data cost of Service 1 reduces the incentive of Service 2
in the bundle formation as the residual margin between the
profit of separate and bundled sales diminishes and becomes
zero at c1 = 1.
Finally, Figure 17 shows that higher quality of one service
increases the profit of the other cooperative service within
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Fig. 16: Profit of Services 1 and 2 under varied data prices of
Service 1 c1.
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Fig. 17: Profit of Services 1 and 2 under varied quality of
Service 1 α31.
the bundle, and vice versa. When the quality of Service 1
is increased (high values of α31) while fixing the quality of
Service 2, the payoff allocations to Services 1 and 2 increase.
However, it is observed that the profit increase of Service 1 is
greater than that of Service 2. In the separate selling case,
Service 2 will not benefit from enhancing the quality of
Service 1. Therefore, there is a profit incentive for service
providers to look for high quality services to cooperate with
when forming bundled services.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed IoT market models and
optimal pricing schemes for the standalone and bundled sales
of machine learning-based IoT services. The proposed opti-
mizations maximize the profit of service providers by deciding
the optimal data sizes that should be bought from data vendors
and the optimal subscription fees at which the services should
be offered to customers. Bundling IoT services has been shown
as an effective marketing strategy for maximizing the profits
of providers. We have observed that service providers have
a profit incentive in searching for the best quality services
to form a bundling coalition. Finally, we have presented a
profit sharing models for allocating the profit payoffs among
cooperative service providers.
In this paper, we have assumed that the service providers are
economically rational, i.e., they take decisions that maximize
their revenues. Future work can improve our optimizations by
exploring the possible competition among service providers.
Moreover, our profit maximization models can be extended to
support complementary and substitute services.
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